|
Venezuela's political and economic prospects were the topic
of a joint meeting held recently by the National Endowment
for Democracy and the Center for International Private Enterprise.
The nature of the Hugo Chávez regime, its relationship
with the military and civil society, and its foreign policy
incursions were among the key topics addressed by the Venezuelan
panelists who spoke at the meeting.
Hernán Castillo
(Assistant Professor of Social Science, Simón Bolivar
University; co-author of "Balance and Perspectives of Civil-Military
Relations in Venezuela…" in the book Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America: Challenges in the Beginning of
the 21st Century, 2000)
Since the election of President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's
military has become an active participant in the country's
social development and delivery of public services. This trend
represents a marked break from the role assigned to the armed
forces by the 1961 constitution that limited their role to
defense of the country. Today, the military are divided largely
between two groups. One comprises the "institutionalists"
who are loyal to the traditional, apolitical role of the armed
forces; the other, labeled the "revolutionaries," views the
military as an institution that has a mandate to promote the
country's social development. Through Chávez the latter
now have at their disposal millions of dollars to spend in
vote-getting public works projects and services.
While military officials occupied a few civilian posts during
previous Venezuelan governments, the key issue today comes
down to civilian oversight of the military. The new constitution
approved in 1999 assigns the armed forces a significant role
in the state, with no civilian control over the military's
budget, procurement practices, etc. In addition, the country's
courts are not authorized to sanction military members, while
congress has been stripped of the power to approve military
promotions. More recently, the legislature failed to approve
a proposal that would have ended the military's control over
the national intelligence agencies.
Comparisons of the 1961 and 1999 constitutions–together
with the prominent role the military now play in the Chávez
government in accordance with its grandiose Plan Bolivar 2000–convincingly
indicate that Venezuela's military has lost its traditional
institutional focus and is now "wed" to politics. This change
is encapsulated in Chávez's frequent rhetorical question:
"How is it possible to demarcate what is clearly military
and what is clearly political?" This represents a dangerous
throwback to Venezuela's independence wars when founding fathers
such as General Sucre were in effect armed citizens, and the
population at large was made up of "farmers-soldiers," "military
managers," and "military politicians."
Laura Rojas de Perez
(Partner, Estrategias para el Desarrollo Integral, and former
Vice Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Vice President-Director
of the Foreign Trade Institute of Venezuela.)
Venezuela is a nation built on profits from petroleum in
accordance in line with what is locally known as a "petrolero
rentista" economic model. Oil exports generate over 80%
of the country's foreign exchange, and the petroleum sector
accounts for one-third of the country's GDP and for more than
half of government revenues. This situation has not changed
in decades, but now there is a major difference. In the 1940s
and 1950s, petroleum was a catalyst for social mobility, but
now it has become an element of social fragmentation, deeply
dividing the haves from the have-nots who are becoming ever
more numerous. Recent surveys indicate that 57% of the population
categorizes itself as poor, unable to obtain basic goods and
services including health and education.
Despite the steep climb in world oil prices, the Chávez
government has been incapable of improving the welfare of
Venezuela's population. Currently, 60% of the laborforce works
in the informal sector and is subject to all the concomitant
socioeconomic ills. Even in the formal sector of the economy
there are vast inequalities in terms of salaries, productivity
and educational levels, etc.
The private sector in general has been incapable of mounting
concerted opposition to Chávez's policies. A principal
reason for this inaction is the business sector's continued
dependence on the state to generate much needed foreign exchange
earnings. A large part of Venezuela's business class is not
competitive internationally, is inward looking, and relies
heavily on the local market. The Chávez administration
has rolled back some trade liberalization policies to gain
points with the local business community hurt by the appreciation
of the bolivar since the uptrend in oil prices.
Contrary to the chavistas' claim, economic inequality
is not the result of rampant corruption by the former ruling
political elites. Rather, it is a longstanding structural
problem for which there are no quick, easy solutions. The
state still plays a dominant industrial role through its continued
ownership of the country's major industries: petrochemicals
and aluminum. (Only the steel sector has been privatized.)
There are just a few truly large private enterprises, which
account for a mere 7% of industrial sector. However, together
with the state-owned companies, these large enterprises generate
almost 90% of Venezuela's industrial exports and account for
fully 55% of the jobs in the industrial sector. Small- and
medium-size industries are plentiful, but their earnings–and
the wages they can afford to pay–are low.
With real unemployment rate topping the 20% mark, it will
be difficult to organize people to mount effective, sustained
opposition to government policies. The primary concern of
most Venezuelans today is subsisting and finding a job. The
major element of uncertainty hanging over Venezuela today
is what will occur when the price of oil goes down. Because
of the sharp increase in poverty in recent years, social adjustments
to the next petroleum crisis are bound to be more painful
than they were in the past.
Vilma Petrásh
(Professor and researcher, Department of Social Sciences,
Simón Bolívar University; Professor, International
and Global Relations, Central University of Venezuela; and
author of Venezuela y los Estados Unidos: orígenes
y evolución de una "relación especial", 2000.)
Venezuela is characterized by petroleum to the point that
its state, society and even the so-called Bolivarian "revolution"
launched by President Chávez are all connected to the
nation’s petroleum production and exports. The classic
model of oil as the catalyst for modernizing the country and
improving the quality of life for Venezuela’s citizens
is no longer valid because sound, consistent government policies
are now lacking. The defining characteristic of the Chávez
regime is "super personalismo."
Venezuela’s foreign policy has changed dramatically
under Hugo Chávez. While he has embraced a policy of
confrontation with the United States, he has openly been cultivating
closer relations with Russia and China in an effort to be
a big player in efforts to reduce US dominance in world affairs
and to create a multi-power world order.
Simultaneously, Chávez has been pursuing secret dealings
with subversive, destabilizing groups in several Latin America
countries. Some examples are his contacts with the Colombian
guerrillas; with Col. Lucio Gutiérrez, leader of the
coup in Ecuador in January 2000; and with opposition groups
in El Salvador, using as a vehicle the humanitarian relief
team Venezuela sent there in the wake of the most recent earthquake.
The Chávez government also is alleged to have provided
financing to indigenous Bolivian farmers during their anti-government
protests last year.
These parallel overt and covert actions could seriously jeopardize
Venezuela's international standing. They are also making neighboring
countries uneasy about the true nature of Chávez's
foreign policy objectives. Not surprisingly, Brazil, Colombia
and Mexico have been trying to "neutralize" Chávez's
revolutionary zeal. In many ways, the overarching objective
of his foreign policy appears to be how much he can "tweak"
the Unites States short of unleashing an outright confrontation.
Q&A Discussion: Key Discussion Points.
Venezuela's subversive initiatives in Latin America merit
careful, constant monitoring. However, in the panelists'
view, the US government's response to President Chávez
has thus far been right on target. Because Venezuela is too
important geopolitically to isolate it, the US should continue
to use the good offices of regional leaders, such as President
Vicente Fox of Mexico and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
of Brazil, to keep the lines of communication open with the
Chávez administration. This approach is much more effective
than directly pressuring Chávez to desist from his
current incursions into the affairs of other Latin American
countries. The panelists also favor the recent decision of
the Bush administration to "regionalize" Plan Colombia.
It is erroneous to assume the military are united in support
of Chávez given traditional service rivalries and the
different ideological orientation of the four military
branches. Having foiled his earlier coup attempts, much
of the National Guard remains opposed to him. The navy would
like to continue joint exercises with its US counterparts.
Finally, important high-ranking officers of the different
services oppose the growing politicization of the armed forces
and question the new constitutional role assigned to them.
They are also critical of Chávez's dealings with the
Colombian guerrillas, fearing they could lead to war.
Chávez is also trying to marginalize some former comrades
in arms who supported him during his coup attempts. Certainly
this is the case of Col. Arias Cárdenas, who now has
openly broken with Chávez. Indeed, the once united
and seemingly monolithic chavismo front has begun to
crumble. It is in this context that one must understand Chávez's
recent efforts to revive his original Movimiento Venezolano
Revolucionario.
Contrary to foreign press reports, political opposition
to Chávez is growing, and he no longer enjoys a majority
in the unicameral legislature. Opposition to the government
comes from many quarters. Civil society groups are coalescing
around several unpopular government moves such as the proposed
educational reform that would add a revolutionary component
to student instruction and Chávez's recent gratuitous
attacks against the church. (The Latin Americans bishops'
decision to hold their most recent meeting in Caracas was
intentionally meant to give Chávez a clear signal of
the church's opposition to many of his policies.) Labor disaffection
with the regime is growing for economic reasons, as well as
a result of the failed referendum last December to change
the leadership of the unions. The largest one by far, the
Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV), will
remain a strong force against the regime even when new union
elections are held in September.
Meanwhile, business groups are becoming more vocal about
the government's failure to enact growth-generating policies.
The two major agricultural associations have loudly criticized
growing land invasions, and they have threatened to mobilize
their membership against further attacks on property rights.
CEDICE (and more recently Consecomercio) continues to espouse
strong liberal, pro free market policies. There is a good
chance that the next president of the powerful Fedecámaras
industry association also will be willing to speak out against
ill-advised government policies.
The once seemingly moribund traditional political parties
are regrouping. Acción Democrática is again
more active, and its fortunes will probably improve with the
decision of Claudio Fermín to rejoin its ranks. The
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) has withdrawn its parliamentary
support for Chávez's initiatives, thereby ending his
majority control of the legislature. There is clear evidence
as well of serious fissures within both the left and right
wings of his own party. As a result, the next elections in
2004 for governors and mayors will be crucial. They will be
a good bellwether of whether or not a new political balance
of power is emerging in Venezuela.
|
